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This paper analyses housing policies in Tokyo and Seoul from comparative 
perspectives. First, unlike production, the state in Japan and Korea has not played an 
active and effective role in the housing sector. Second, the state in the West has been 
more concerned about housing than Japanese and Korean states, and the local state in 
the West has also pursued more independent housing policies than the Tokyo and Seoul 
Metropolitan Governments. Third, in spite of their similarities at the macro level, 
Japanese housing policies have been more quality and equality oriented than Korean 
housing policies. 
INTRODUCTION 
State-centric analysts mainly discuss the expansion of the state's 
"economic role" (Evans 1986) in Japan and Korea. The Japanese and Korean 
states selected export-led industries that were compatible with the 
international market, strongly supported their development, and protected 
them from foreign competition until they grew strong enough to compete 
with foreign capital. This image of the efficient state in the two countries, 
however, does not apply to the housing sector. The state in Japan and Korea 
has not paid much attention to supporting and intervening in the 
population's consumption such as housing. The percentage of housing in 
the total central state's expenditure is very low: 1.8 percent in 1986 in Japan 
and 2.9 percent in 1987 in Korea. The local state, which takes a major 
responsibility in housing in some other countries, does not do that in Japan 
and Korea because it lacks the authority to make its own housing policies. 
Not only does the state invest less in the housing sector, but existing 
housing policies are also ineffective considering their outcomes: the middle-
class-oriented housing policies have not improved homeownership, and the 
tax system designed to control real estate speculation has failed to control 
land and housing prices. Therefore, the state's proper guidance and 
intervention in production in Japan and Korea, has not been similarly 
applied to the housing sector. 
"This paper is based in part on the author's doctoral dissertation. 
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How can we explain this unbalanced role of the state in production and 
the housing sector in Japan and Korea? One major answer can be found in 
the limited financial resources of the state in general. To avoid "fiscal crisis" 
(O'Conner 1973), the state in Japan and Korea puts a priority on production 
over consumption. The administrative structure is also organized to mainly 
support industrialization. While the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MIT!) and the Economic Planning Board (EPB)1 have centralized 
power in performing economic policies, there is no one ministry that takes 
complete responsibility for housing. Finally, the local state's lack of 
autonomy from the central state limits the possibility of making alternate 
housing policies at the local level. 
The Japanese and Korean cases sharply contrast with the situation in 
Western countries. State support for consumption and housing is more 
developed in the West than in Japan and Korea. Because the local state in 
many Western countries is responsible for consumption, even in the 
situation of the central state's neglect of the housing sector, local 
governments still can pursue their own housing policies. The state in the 
West has increasingly focused on demand-side subsidy, supporting tenants 
by helping them pay rents, while the Japanese and Korean states have 
developed supply-side subsidies. 
Even though the Japanese and Korean states similarly play an ineffective 
role in housing, they also show variations in terms of the degree of 
emphasis on quality and equality in housing policies. Japanese housing 
policies are more quality and equality oriented than their counterparts in 
Korea. These differences are largely due to two factors: Japan's economic 
development is higher than Korea's; and compared to Japan where local 
governments exist at least legally, the Korean state is highly centralized. 
This paper, therefore, makes the following arguments. First, unlike its 
intervention in industrialization, the state in Japan and Korea does not 
effectively guide the housing sector. Second, compared to Japan and Korea, 
state support for housing is outstanding, and the local state takes major 
responsibility for housing in the West. Third, in spite of their similarities, the 
Japanese state performs more quality and equality oriented policies than the 
Korean state. 
lThe Economic Planning Board (EPB) and the Ministry of Finance were merged into the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in December, 1994. 
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HOUSING POLICIES IN JAPAN AND KOREA 
Housing Policies at the National Level 
The first comprehensive housing policies in both Japan and Korea were 
established in the 1960s. A five-year housing construction plan was passed 
in 1966 in Japan and a five-year housing construction plan was instituted in 
1962 in Korea. Japanese housing policies have a longer history than their 
counterparts in Korea. Housing policy in Japan made its first appearance in 
1919 through a series of laws2 (Honma 1983: 398, 546-7). During and right 
after World War II, Japanese housing policies targeted specific groups, 
especially laborers who were necessary to the war economy and industrial 
rehabilitation. With high economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, a series of 
housing construction plans were promulgated.3 However, incorrect 
predictions led to plan after plan being formulated even before the period of 
the previous plan was over. Finally in 1966, the Japanese government 
started a five-year housing construction plan based on the Housing 
Construction Planning Law, which is considered the first comprehensive 
plan including both the public and private sectors. 
Compared to Japan's long history of housing policy, the Korean 
government made little intervention in the housing sector until 1962. In 
spite of a serious housing shortage after Independence in 1945, no 
significant legal and administrative system was established between 1945 
and 1950. This lack of governmental housing policy lasted through the 
1950s, with minor exceptions for relief housing construction: for example, a 
housing program for homeless urban people after the Korean War in 1953, 
and temporary housing construction from 1954 to 1956 with supporting 
funds from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the 
United States Agency for International Development (Koh 1983: 39). In 1962, 
the Korean government launched a systematic housing policy for the first 
time. Therefore, in Japan and Korea, five-year housing construction plans 
currently represent their national housing policies. Tables 1 and,2 
summarize historical changes of five-year housing construction plans in 
2The laws include the Law of City Planning and Urban Building (1919), the Law of Leased 
Land and Houses (1921), the Law of the Housing Association (1921) and the Conciliation Law 
of Leased Land and Houses (1923). 
3Examples of housing construction plans in the 1950s and 1960s are a 3-year plan for local 
public housing, 10-year plans for housing construction (1955-1964), 5-year plans for housing 
construction (1957-1961), new 5-year plans for housing construction (1961-1965), and 7-year 
plans for housing construction (1964-1970). 
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TABLE 1. 5-YEAR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION PLAN IN JAPAN 
The 1st term The 2nd term The3rd term The 4th term The 5th term 
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
The l2u!l2Qse of I2lan 
The improve- The improve- The improve- The improve- The improve-
mentof mentof mentof mentof mentof 
housing housing dwelling dwelling dwelling 
shortage shortage standard standard standard 
One house One room Minimum Minimum 
per household per person & ordinary & ordinary 
dwelling dwelling 
standard standard 
Housing construction I2lan (total numbers in 1,000) 
6,700 9,576 8,600 7,700 6,700 
Housing construction achievement (total numbers in 1,000) 
6,739 8,280 7,698 6,104 8,284 
<100.6> <86.5> <89.5> <79.3> <123.6> 
Note: < >: Rates of achievement. 
Sources: HUDC (1988: 190-94); Mitsui Real Estate Development Corporation (1992: 68). 
TABLE 2. 5-YEAR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION PLAN IN KOREA 
The 1st term 
1962-66 
The 2nd term 
1967-71 
The l2u!l2Qse of I2lan 
The increase The increase 















Housing construction I2lan (total numbers in 1,000) 
475 500 833 1,330 
Housing construction achievement (total numbers in 1,000) 
325.9 540.3 760.6 1,116.0 
<68.6> <108.1> <91.3> <83.9> 
Notes: < >: Rates of achievement. 






















1) refers to the original number in the Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan. As 
housing problems became more serious, the Korean government established another Five-
Year Two-Million Housing Unit Construction Plan in 1988. 
Sources: KNHC (1989: 39-41); Ministry of Construction (1987: 72). 
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these two countries. 
The purposes of the Japanese housing construction plans differ from 
those of the Korean plans; the former has changed its focus from quantity to 
quality, whereas the latter is still concerned about housing quantity. Japan 
achieved the goal, "one house per household", in the late 1960s, but Korea 
still suffers from the problem of hou~ing shortage. Therefore, the total 
numbers of planned dwelling units have declined in Japan since the second 
five-year housing construction plan (1971-75), whereas they have increased 
continuously in Korea. 
Housing Policies at the Local Level 
In both Tokyo and Seoul, local housing construction plans are required to 
follow the national five-year housing construction plans. Even though a 
significant amount of data and information flows from the local level to the 
national level, the local views do not get much notice, and the central 
government has the final authority (Jain 1989: 126). Therefore, in general, 
local housing policy is not very different from the national one. The local 
state in Tokyo and Seoul, however, has its own area of housing policies 
concerning low-income households. 
Low-income housing construction policies in Tokyo are represented by 
publicly-managed housing. Based on the Publicly-Managed Law (Kooei 
Juutakuhoo)4 of 1951 mandating housing construction for low-income 
groups at low rent, publicly-managed housing has two types of programs, 




Qualified Persons Area Allowed 
Those who fit certain qualifications More than 19 m2 but below 80 m2 
set by the Ministry of Construction 
1. Those whose income is so low that More than 19 m2 but below 75 m2 
they cannot afford Type I 
2. Those low-income groups who have lost 
their houses in some form of disaster 
Note: Income categories vary according to the source of income and numbers of household 
members. For example, in case of salaried workers, maximum level of yearly income is as 
follows (as of 1988): 
1 person household; 0-1,951,999 yen (Type I) and 1,952,000-3,015,999 yen (Type II) 
2 person household; 0-2,423,999 yen (Type I) and 2,424,000-3,463,999 yen (Type II) 
3 person household; 0-2,895,999 yen (Type I) and 2,896,000-3,875,999 yen (Type II) 
4 person household; 0-3,349,999 yen (Type I) and 3,350,000-4,287,999 yen (Type II) 
5 person household; 0-3,771,999 yen (Type I) and 3,772,000-4,699,999 yen (Type II) 
Sources: Jain (1989: 117); TMG (1988b: 46). 
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Type I and Type II (see Table 3). Type II housing is designed for households 
with less income than those of Type I housing. Different interpretations of 
the qualification of tenants by the local state and tenants have created severe 
conflicts between the two parties. While tenants insist on the right of 
residence even when their income becomes higher than a maximum limit, 
the local state wants to reassign those houses to other low-income families. 
Unlike in Tokyo, low-income housing has not been systematically 
developed in Seoul. In 1989, however, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
established the public housing corporation, the Seoul Metropolitan Urban 
Development Corporation, for residents of urban renewal areas and low-
income families. In contrast to Tokyo, the demolition of illegal houses in 
urban redevelopment projects has represented one of the major housing 
policies in Seoul. Some sources (Ha 1984: 128-59; Seoul Metropolitan 
Government (b) 1971-86) show that the Seoul Metropolitan Government has 
depended on four types of urban redevelopment projects: (1) the clearance 
program of squatter settlements, (2) the legalization and self-help 
development program, (3) the relocation and site-and-service program, and 
(4) the high density apartment construction program. Regardless of 
differences in their methods, all programs are commonly used to solve 
illegal housing problems in Seoul. The Seoul Metropolitan Government has 
destroyed illegal houses without making resettlement plans for residents, 
especially tenants. This lack of genuine concern for the poor in housing 
policies has brought continuous appeals, demonstrations, and urban riots in 
Seoul (Toshi Pinmin Yon'guso 1988; Soch'olhyop 1988). 
Housing Policies of Public Housing Corporations 
The central and local states in Japan and Korea do not build houses by 
themselves, even when they initiate construction plans. For actual housing 
construction, they created public housing corporations. Public corporations 
in the housing sector are largely divided into two types in both Japan and 
Korea: national housing construction corporations and local housing 
construction corporations. Housing construction corporations at the 
national level include the Housing and Urban Development Corporation in 
Japan and the Korea National Housing Corporation in Korea. Housing 
construction corporations at the local level are the Tokyo Metropolitan 
4The Publicly-Managed Housing Law requires the national government's cooperation with 
local government. Even though local governments have direct responsibility, the central 
government also helps local governments through a national subsidy program Oain 1989: 
117). 
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Housing Supply Corporation in Tokyo and the Seoul Metropolitan Urban 
Development Corporation in Seoul. 
The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (formally called the 
Japan Housing Corporation) and the Korea National Housing Corporation 
were established when the two countries began comprehensive plans of 
economic development after World War II, in 1955 and 1962 respectively. 
According to their prospectuses, the target populations claimed by the two 
corporations look different: The Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation (1988) is for middle-income households, while the Korea 
National Housing Corporation (1983: 6) is for low-income households. In 
reality, however, the Korea National Housing Corporation also constructs 
houses largely for the middle income group. Over 80 percent of apartments 
constructed by the Korea National Housing Corporation between 1982 and 
1986 were for sale (the KNHC 1988). Even among the small portion of 
apartments for rent, rental periods are temporary, and tenants are required 
to buy apartments within five years.5 Permanent rental housing was 
introduced in 1990 for the first time. Therefore, the Korea National Housing 
Corporation targets the housing class able to afford homeownership, that is, 
the middle class. Indeed, the percentage of homeownership in Seoul is less 
than 50 percent of all households. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Housing Supply Corporation and the Seoul 
Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation were founded for housing 
construction and management, land development, and urban renewal 
projects at the local level. Unlike the Tokyo Metropolitan Housing Supply 
Corporation whose origin can be traced back to 1919 as the Tokyo Housing 
Association,6 the Seoul Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation was 
established very recently in 1989.7 Although the general purposes of the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Housing Supply Corporation and the Seoul 
Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation resemble each other, the 
target population of the two organizations is different: The Tokyo 
SSince 1982, the KNHC has extended the rental period to 20 years, while expiring the I-year 
rental housing program. However, 20-year rental housing occupies less than 10 percent of 
total rental housing construction (see Table 12). 
6The Tokyo Housing Association was restructured in 1950 for the purpose of providing 
apartments for rent, based on loans from the Housing Loan Corporation, and renamed as the 
Tokyo Housing Corporation. The Tokyo Housing Corporation was unified with the Tokyo 
Land Development Corporation in 1966, and then renamed as today's Tokyo Metropolitan 
Housing Supply Corporation. 
7The crucial reason for establishing the SMUDC lies in a very rapid increase of housing 
prices, and continuous housing movements in urban redevelopment areas of Seoul in the late 
1980s. 
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Mett:opolitan Housing Supply Corporation (1988a) aims for middle-income 
households, while the Seoul Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation 
(1989) focuses on low-income households. In this sense, the Seoul 
Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation can be considered a 
combination of publicly-managed housing and the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Housing Supply Corporation. 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN HOUSING 
Japan and Korea tend to have the highest growth rate of GOP in the entire 
world. The average annual growth rate of GDP was 10.9 in Japan and 8.6 in 
Korea between 1960 and 1970, while it was 3.8 in Japan and 7.9 in Korea 
between 1980 and 1985 (the World Bank 1987). These numbers seem 
extremely high when they are contrasted with those of several of the groups 
of nations suggested by the World Bank: the low-income nations, the 
middle-income oil-importing nations, and the nineteen industrial market 
economies, as Table 4 shows. 
Scholars of development studies suggest that the strong role of the state is 
one of the major causes of the high growth rates of these two countries. The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan and the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Korea have provided long-term plans for 
the entire economy to guide priorities of financing, foreign exchange, and 
technology transfer. While the Japanese and Korean states have stressed 
industrialization, they have avoided another responsibility, the 
improvement of welfare. Japan is well known for its weak welfare function 
compared to other OECD countries. In Korea, the concept of "welfare" did 
not appear in national policies until the 1980s. Similarly the housing sector 
has been neglected for the sake of economic growth in the two countries, 
because it is not directly related to industrialization. The Korean and 
Japanese states' expenditure on production and consumption (including 
TABLE 4. AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GOP) 
Average annual growth in GOP 
1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 
Low-income Economies 4.4 4.6 7.3 
Middle-income Economies 5.9 5.6 1.7 
Korea 8.6 9.5 7.9 
Industrial Market Economies 5.2 3.2 2.3 
Japan 10.9 5.0 3.8 
Source: The World Bank (1982; 1987). 
COMPARING HOUSING POLICIES IN TOKYO AND SEOUL 35 
housing) stresses the low priority given to consumption in their national 
and local policies. 
The Central State 
Tables 5 through 7 show that the central state's expenditure on 
consumption in Japan and Korea is much lower than their counterparts in 
the West. According to Table 5, the Japanese state's expenditure on 
consumption increased from 25.3 percent in 1960 to 32.0 percent in 1980, 
and then declined slightly to 30.3 percent by 1986. By contrast, the Korean 
state's expenditure on consumption has continuously increased from 19.9 
percent in 1978 to 28.3 percent in 1987. The share of the central 
government's spending allocated to consumption in Japan and Korea had 
become similar by the late 1980s. The major category of consumption, 
however, is different in these two countries: social security occupies around 
two thirds of consumption spending in Japan, whereas education represents 
half of the consumption expenditure in Korea. Housing is considered the 
least important among of three consumption categories in both states. 
Japan and Korea spend much less for consumption than their Western 
counterparts. According to Table 7, state expenditure on consumption in all 
seventeen Western countries exceeds 40 percent of total expenditures. The 
lowest one is the US's 44.3 percent (1986), which is 14 to 16 percent higher 
than Japan's 30.3 percent (1986) and Korea's 28.3 percent (1987). Seven 
countries including Spain, Austria, Netherlands, Germany, Finland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, spend more than 60 percent of their total 
expenditure on consumption. The low percentage of consumption 
TABLE 5. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN JAPAN (UNIT: PERCENT) 
1960 1970 1980 1986 
Consumption 25.3 27.4 32.0 30.3 
Housing 0.7 1.2 1.8 1.8 
Education & culture 12.1 11.5 10.7 9.1 
Social security 12.5 14.7 19.5 19.4 
National agencies 9.8 6.7 5.0 4.9 
Local government finance 19.0 21.7 18.1 18.2 
Defense 9.4 7.3 5.2 6.2 
Land development 16.9 16.6 13.8 11.0 
Industrial development 9.4 12.4 9.2 5.9 
Others 10.2 7.9 16.7 23.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency (1988: 442). 
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TABLE 6. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN KOREA (UNIT: PERCENT) 
1978 1980 1985 1987 
Consumption 19.9 22.5 27.3 28.3 
Housing 0.4 1.2 4.2 2.9 
Education 13.7 14.6 16.6 16.7 
Social security & health 5.8 6.7 6.5 8.7 
General public service 9.5 8.5 9.4 8.9 
Defense 32.6 30.6 26.6 25.4 
Community development 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.4 
Social services 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 
Economic services 26.2 26.0 21.9 20.0 
Others 10.0 10.4 10.2 16.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: EPB (1987: 506). 
TABLE 7. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, SELECTED ADVANCED CAPITALIST 
COUNTRIES IN 1986 
Consumption 
Total Housing Health Educ. Defense Economic Other 
& Social Service 
welfare 
Germany,FR 69.0 50.5 17.9 0.6 8.8 6.8 15.4 
Spain 67.8 48.5 13.1 6.2 4.4 11.7 16.3 
Switzerland 66.8 50.6 13.1 3.1 10.3 12.2 10.8 
Austria 64.3 42.6 12.0 9.7 3.1 13.8 18.8 
Sweden 61.8 51.8 1.1 8.9 6.6 6.8 24.8 
Netherlands 61.7 39.8 10.8 11.1 5.2 10.7 22.5 
Finland 60.0 35.7 10.6 13.7 5.2 21.0 13.7 
Belgium 56.2 41.5 1.7 13.0 5.3 11.9 26.5 
New Zealand 55.6 32.2 12.5 10.9 4.7 12.3 27.4 
Ireland 55.0 30.1 13.2 11.7 3.1 15.0 26.9 
Norway 54.2 35.0 10.5 8.7 8.3 19.5 17.9 
Denmark 50.2 40.0 1.0 9.2 5.2 6.8 37.8 
Italy 47.1 30.0 9.9 7.2 3.2 13.2 36.5 
Australia 45.6 28.9 9.5 7.2 9.3 7.8 37.3 
UK 44.9 30.2 12.6 2.1 13.3 8.9 33.0 
Canada 44.5 35.0 6.1 3.4 7.6 14.9 33.1 
U.S.A. 44.3 31.0 11.6 1.7 25.8 8.8 21.1 
Source: The World Bank (1988). 
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expenditure in Korea can be understood in two ways. First, considering its 
economic level as a semi-peripheral country, Korea still needs to invest large 
sums of state expenditure for the construction of basic infrastructure. The 
Korean government's spending on economic services, around 20 percent in 
total, is comparable only with the Finnish government's (21.0 percent in 
1986). Second, Korea spends almost one fourth of its budget for defense, 
which is one of the highest in the world. By contrast, in Japan, in spite of a 
high GNP per capita and low spending for defense (6.2 percent in 1986), the 
state obviously spends less for consumption compared to its counterparts in 
the West. Therefore, whether they spend a high percentage of their total 
expenditure on defense or not, both Japanese and Korean states spend a low 
percentage of total expenditure on consumption. 
Local State 
In many Western countries, the local state is responsible for consumption, 
while the central state concentrates on production. Saunders's (1986) dual 
politics thesis focuses on the division of labor between the central and local 
states. The Tokyo and Seoul metropolitan governments, similar to their 
central governments, however, are not especially concerned with 
consumption (Tables 8 and 9). 
TABLE 8. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN TOKYO (UNIT: PERCENT) 
1965 1980 1984 
Consumption 27.2 32.2 31.3 
Housing 6.8 5.1 4.4 
Social welfare 3.3 6.2 5.9 
Education & culture 17.13) 20.9 21.0 
General administrative expenditure 5.8 5.3 5.5 
Labor & economy administration 6.5 4.0 4.2 
City planning & Environ. protection 2.54) 2.2 1.4 
Sanitation & waste disposal 7.15) 6.2 5.8 
Public works!) 18.7 8.6 7.6 
Police & fire 12.1 15.4 14.0 
Others2) 20.1 26.1 30.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1) includes ports and harbors. 
2) includes debts and miscellaneous. 
3) includes only education in 1965. 
4) means capital city development in 1965. 
5) means public health and public cleaning in 1965. 
Sources: Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1972b); Tokyo Statistical Association (1965-85). 
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TABLE 9. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN SEOUL (UNIT: PERCENT) 
1965 1980 1987 
Consumption 12.8 11.5 18.6 
Housing 0.6 
Social works 7.1 6.4 
Health 5.7 4.5 
Administrative expense 20.3 20.6 23.1 
Finance 4.5 3.4 
Environment protection 5.8 
Industry 1.8 4.6 0.7 
Afforestation 3.7 
Construction works 36.2 25.5 28.61) 
City planning 3.3 1.2 
Public safety 0.9 
Sewage facilities 5.8 3.6 
Transportation & tourism 0.6 1.1 
Civil defense 2.2 5.8 
Fire fighting 1.5 1.8 
Others 13.2 14.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Items of expenditure in Seoul have changed over 22 years. Sub-categories of each item 
however are not clearly suggested in the census. 
1) is categorized as community development in 1987. 
2) includes culture and sports expenses. 
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government (a) 0965-88). 
In Tokyo, consumption accounts for around 30 percent of total 
expenditure over 20 years, which is similar to the central state's spending on 
consumption (30.3 percent in 1986). In Seoul, (even though numbers in 
Table 7 are not completely comparable because of the changes of items in 
the state expenditure accounts), consumption always occupies less than 20 
percent of the total between 1965 and 1987. This percentage is even lower 
than the Korean government's spending on consumption. In 1987, while the 
percentage of consumption was 18.6 in Seoul, it was 28.3 in Korea. The local 
governments in Tokyo and Seoul thus follow their central governments' 
policies towards consumption. Consumption, including housing, is 
emphasized far less in Japan and Korea than in the West at both the national 
and local levels. 
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THE EVALUATION OF HOUSING POLICIES 
Housing Construction Policies 
Housing construction for low-income households is limited in both Japan 
and Korea. In Japan, the total number of dwelling units of publicly-
managed housing did not change greatly from 223,600 in 1951-55 to 209,714 
in 1986-90. In Korea, no systematic housing program for low-income 
families had been developed until 1990 at the national level. The only public 
sector for low-income housing at the municipal level, the Seoul 
Metropolitan Urban Development Corporation, was established in 1989. 
According to its 1989 pamphlet, the Seoul Metropolitan Urban 
Development Corporation's major plan was to construct 80,000 houses by 
1992 in the Seoul Metropolitan area. Because these housing construction 
plans were largely designed to serve those residents whose homes were 
demolished in urban redevelopment projects, most low-income families did 
not have the opportunity to apply for the Seoul Metropolitan Urban 
Development Corporation housing. 
The low percentage of low-income housing in the total of public housing 
construction implies that Japanese and Korean housing construction policies 
focus on middle-income households. The Japanese government has 
promoted housing construction for middle-income families by providing 
loans through the Japan Housing Loan Corporation,8 instead of building 
houses directly. Therefore, the total number of dwelling units financed by 
the Japan Housing Loan Corporation increased greatly from 457,800 in 
1956-60 to 2,085,261 in 1986-90 (Mitsui Real Estate Development 
Corporation, 1992: 81), whereas those constructed by the Housing and 
Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) declined continuously once they 
reached a peak in 1966-70 (Table 10). Similarly, the Korean government has 
implemented housing construction policies for mid.dle-income families by 
providing loans through the Korea Housing Bank (KHB)9 as well as by 
BThe Japan Housing Loan Corporation OHLC) was founded in 1950 with the purpose of 
furthering private housing construction by financing long-term, low-interest housing loans 
because private banks and other financial agencies provided their funds largely to stimulate 
industrialization after the war. According to the surveys on housing loan borrowers, housing 
loans from the JHLC were found to serve the middle-income households: 74 percent of the 
JHLC loan borrowers belonged to the 60th percentile of middle income groups excluding the 
lowest and the highest 20th percentile in 1987 OHLC 1988: 141). 
9The Korea Housing Bank (KHB) was established in 1967 to mobilize housing funds and to 
stimulate the private sector's participation in housing construction activities. Like the HLC, 
the KHB was also turned out to serve the middle class: the average income of the KHB 
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TABLE 10. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY HUDC 
Japan Tokyo Areal) 
Number For sale For sale For rent Number For sale For sale For rent 
of units (%) to rent2) (%) of units (%) to rent2) (%) 
(%) (%) 
1955-60 170,587 3.9 34.2 61.9 55,190 6.6 28.0 65.4 
(100.0) (32.4) 
1961-65 189,196 4.3 29.1 66.6 61,943 6.9 19.2 73.9 
(100.0) (32.7) 
1966-70 335,037 15.9 21.2 62.9 121,988 20.1 13.0 66.9 
(100.0) (36.4) 
1971-75 260,344 20.3 14.4 65.3 73,817 23.5 11.0 65.5 
(100.0) (28.4) 
1976-80 162,700 47.2 32.2 20.6 54,677 54.8 28.4 16.8 
(100.0) (33.6) 
1981-85 105,172 32.9 38.6 28.5 39,401 34.7 37.0 28.3 
(100.0) (37.5) 
1986-90 86,612 
Notes: 1) Tokyo area includes Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa. 
2) For sale to rent means that houses are constructed for landlords to rent. 
Source: HUDC (1988). 
TABLE 11. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY THE TOKYO METROPOLITAN HOUSING SUPPLY 
CORPORATION 
Total For Sale For Rent Others 
1950-55 6,059 491 5,384 184 
(100.0) (8.1) (88.9) (3.0) 
1956-60 8,571 652 7,194 725 
(100.0) (7.6) (83.9) (8.5) 
1961-65 12,903 2,171 10,039 693 
(100.0) (16.8) (77.8) (5.4) 
1966-70 28,803 9,394 19,103 306 
(100.0) (32.6) (66.3) (1.1) 
1971-75 13,470 4,351 8,783 336 
(100.0) (32.3) (65.2) (2.5) 
1976-80 9,503 2,835 6,553 115 
(100.0) (29.8) (69.0) (1.2) 
1981-85 6,423 2,740 2,747 936 
(100.0) (42.7) (42.8) (14.6) 
Source: TMHSC (1988b). 
housing loan borrowers was 600,000 won per month (526,000 won per month in case of the 
Nationl Housing Fund ), far exceeding 481,018 won of the average urban laborers' monthly 
income in the same year (EPB 1986). 
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directly building houses through the Korea National Housing Corporation 
(KNHC). The total number of houses financed by the KHB increased from 
61,744 in 1967-71 to 795,189 in 1983-87 (KNHC 1989: 80). Unlike Japan, the 
total number of housing units directly constructed by the KNHC also rose 
from 5,159 in 1962-66 to 186,678 in 1982-86 (Table 12). 
This concern with middle-income housing construction is mainly due to 
the Japanese and Korean governments' emphasis on homeownership. 
Unlike European countries, whose policies switched from public rental to 
homeownership in the 1970s (Harloe 1985), the Japanese and Korean 
governmens' have emphasized homeowners hip as a major goal from the 
beginning of housing policies (TMG 1972a; Oomoto 1990; KRIHS 1979, 
1987). In Japan, the state's stress on homeownership has become even 
stronger than before. According to Tables 10 and 11, the main focus of 
publicly-supplied houses by the HUDC and the TMHC has moved from 
rental to ownership over the past 30 years. In Korea, publicly-supplied 
houses have always been for sale until 1990: 80 percent of houses 
constructed by the KNHC were for sale between 1982 and 1986, and the 
TABLE 12. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BY THE KOREA NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION 
1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 
Korea 
Total 5,159 7,739 54,420 154,031 186,678 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0> (100.0) (100.0) 
For sale 5,159 6,669 35,770 106,314 151,384 
(100.0) (86.2) (65.7) (69.0) (81.1) 
For rent 1,070 18,650 47,717 35,294 
(13.8) (34.3) (31.0) (18.9) 
1 year 300 18,015 46,632 
5 years 26,872 
20 years 5,000 
Others 770 635 1,085 3,422 
Seoul 
Total 4,170 5,423 33,062 31,518 43,809 
(80.8) (70.2) (60.7) (20.5) (23.5) 
For sale 4,170 5,123 25,417 28,908 40,039 
For rent 
1 year 300 7,645 2,610 
5 years 3,770 
20 years 
Sources: KNHC (1987; 1988; 1989). 
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other 20 percent of houses for rent were also planned for sale after a certain 
period of time (Table 12). 
Why does the state in Japan and Korea pay special concern to middle-
income families, even though the private housing market can supply homes 
for them? People in Japan and Korea are strongly attached to 
homeownership. Therefore, the state cannot ignore this strong desire to own 
homes in policy making to gain political support. More practically speaking, 
however, the state can avoid budgetary commitments to public housing. 
Whereas social housing for low-income families financially depends on the 
state, middle-income housing programs charge whole costs to consumers. 
By pursuing middle-income-oriented housing policies, therefore, the 
Japanese and Korean states do not need to spend large sums on housing, 
while still catering to the majority's desire. 
In spite of the increase in the total number of houses constructed for 
middle-income families, and the government's stress on middle-income 
housing in Japan and Korea, the rate of homeownership is not increased; the 
percentages of homeownership in Japan have remained at just over 40 
percent between 1968 and 1983, those in Korea have even declined from 48.1 
percent in 1970 to 40.8 percent in 1985. Major causes of failing to increase the 
percentage of homeowners hip are rapid increases of housing prices and 
underdevelopment of a housing loan system. In both Japan and Korea, 
conflicts between expectations and actual conditions in homeownership are 
serious: as personal income increases and government stresses 
homeownership as a major housing policy, housing consumers, largely 
middle-income families, expect to own their homes. However, in reality, 
unaffordable housing prices and the lack of housing loan services 
discourage them from becoming homeowners. Therefore, housing policies 
for middle-income families in Japan and Korea also fail to satisfy their target 
population's major concern of being homeowners. 
Tax and Land Policies to Control Housing Prices in Japan and Korea 
One of major housing problems in Japan and Korea is the rapid increase 
of housing prices, partly due to speculation. There are great differences in 
attitudes in responding to an outcry against "speculation". For example, 
among Western countries, "unearned increment" has not aroused any 
particular concern in the USA, whereas in Britain, Labour Governments 
have been obsessed with creaming-off "unearned increment" to the 
exclusion of all other considerations. Between the two extremes, the 
Japanese and Korean governments resemble more the latter than the former. 
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However, there are basic differences between Japan and Korea in 
interpreting the problem of unaffordable housing prices. Japanese 
government officials and scholars insist that high land prices are the major 
cause of high housing prices (Jain 1987). By contrast, the Koreans see the 
cause of the rapid increase of housing prices as largely due to housing 
speculation, especially since the 1970s (KRIHS 1981). Therefore, the major 
tax system invented for the prevention of speculation applies to land in 
Japan, whereas it is for housing in Korea. 
BoJh countries similarly levy taxes on income from real estate 
transactions: land transactions in Japan and housing transactions in Korea. 
In Japan, the combined central and local government tax rates for recently 
acquired land property (five years or less) are 52 percent to 86 p~rcent of the 
income from real estate transactions, whereas their counterparts for lands 
purchased longer than five years ago are around 26 percent to 38 percent in 
the case of individuals (Ikegami 1988: 65). For corporations, the tax on land 
owned less than two years is at the high rate of 96 percent for corporations 
having profits and 35 percent for corporations having losses (TMG 1987: 
238). But the system also includes preferential measures, which are helping 
to fuel the land price boom (Mitsuharu 1987). People buying a new home at 
least as expensive as the old one within one year of selling the old one have 
their tax reduced to zero. The same concession applies when an individual 
sells a business asset, such as a restaurant, shop, or office, as long as the 
property is located in a part of Tokyo or Osaka which is designated as a 
highly developed district or an atmospheric pollution zone, and the 
proceeds of the sale are used to purchase land or buildings outside of these 
areas. 
Because of this concession, almost everyone who sells property in central 
Tokyo at high prices immediately reinvests the proceeds back into real 
estate elsewhere. Since even small plots sell for vast sums, the amount of 
money being r~invested in real estate is enormous. The preferred sites for 
the new homes are in tl1e residential areas in the western half of Tokyo. This 
is why, when central Tokyo sales gained new momentum in 1986, western 
Tokyo land prices took off. For example, when land prices of residential 
areas increased by 9.6 percent in the central 23 ku of Tokyo between July 
and October in 1987, they increased by 31.6 percent in the Western Tama 
during the same time period (TMG 1987: 149). 
Similarly, in Korea, taxes are levied on profits gained by housing 
transactions. The tax rate is 50 percent of profits for houses owned less than 
two years, 30 percent-40 percent for houses owned longer than two years, 
and 75 percent for those whose purchases are not registered. If houses are 
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sold after one year of residence by households owning only one house, or if 
they are owned longer than three years regardless of residence, taxes are 
exempt.lO Similar to Japan, the transaction tax which aims to prevent 
housing specUlation, has not been successful. When housing prices increase 
very rapidly, a 50 percent tax rate and one year of residence requirement are 
not effective devices to control speculation. Even though capital gains from 
land increased from 10,923 billion won in 1985 to 12,341 billion won in 1986, 
the total amount of transaction tax levied from individuals and corporations 
declined from 4,032 billion won to 2,824 billion won over the same period 
(T'oji Kong'gaenyom Yon'guhwe 1989: 190; 239). 
THE CAUSES OF THE INEFFECTNE ROLE OF THE STATE IN HOUSING 
How can we explain the state's different emphasis of and financial 
spending on production and consumption (including the housing sector) in 
Japan and Korea? Answers are sought by analyzing a capitalist state's dual 
roles, administrative structure, and the autonomy of the local state from the 
central state. 
The State's Dual Roles 
O'Connor and Castells provide theoretical explanation as to why the 
Japanese and Korean states cannot stress production and consumption at 
the same time. According to O'Connor (1973), a capitalist state must try to 
fulfill two basic functions: accumulation and legitimization. The state must 
help one class accumulate capital even at the expense of other classes, at the 
same time, the state should not undermine the basis of its loyalty and 
support for social harmony (O'Connor 1973: 6). Based on these dual 
functions of the capitalist state, state expenditures too are organized into 
two parts: social capital for profitable private accumulation and social 
expenses for the state's legitimization function. Social capital is again 
divided into two: social investment to increase the productivity of labor and 
social consumption to lower the reproduction costs of labor power. By 
escalating demands on all three areas of the state budget, the state 
eventually faces a fiscal crisis. 
Castells (1978) also mentions the similar fiscal problem of a capitalist 
state. In his view, the state intervenes to promote collective consumption as 
well as production. However, "state intervention in the maintenance of 
lO'fhe minimum requirement of residence has recently increased from one to three years 
and that of ownership from three to five years. 
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essential but unprofitable public services has effectively been carried out at 
the cost of an inflationary and growing public debt" (Castells 1978: 175). 
Faced with this problem, the state reacts by cutting its level of expenditure 
and redirecting resources from the support of labor-power (collective 
consumption) to the direct support of capital (production). The result is a 
crisis in the provision of collective consumption. 
According to both O'Connor and Castells, the state's efforts to fulfill all 
activities create financial problems, thus implying that the state's different 
roles always conflict with each other. The relation between production and 
consumption, however, does not need to be contradictory. Consumption 
rises as production develops, as a result of increased output on the one hand 
and as a result of increased personal income on the other hand. At the same 
time, production of goods and services is stimulated as consumption needs 
are increased. In spite of their interrelated and complementary relations, 
production and consumption cannot avoid competing with each other 
because state resources are limited. 
Similarly, arguments about the state's major functions, its limited 
resources, and its fiscal crisis, apply to the Japanese and Korean contexts. 
For the Japanese and Korean states, too, resources and expenditures are 
limited. As late-comers in the world economy, they chose to place priority 
on industrial investment over consumption instead of stressing both. This 
basic policy has not changed much since it was formed. 
Administrative Structure 
The state's low spending on housing is partly related to the 
administrative structure in Japan and Korea. In both countries, the Ministry 
of Construction controls the overall housing policy. Because the Ministry of 
Construction (MOC) in Japan and Korea was established largely to perform 
construction policies, housing is considered as a part of the activities of the 
MOC. Moreover, the MOCs in these countries do not have independent 
decision-making power, because other ministries also are involved in 
housing policy. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has a direct impact on 
housing policies through its allocation of funds from the general account to 
other ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) guides and 
controls the functions of local governments for local housing policy. 
Therefore, the MOCs' housing policies in Japan and Korea are directly 
influenced by the interests of other ministries. 
More importantly, housing policies in these two countries are similarly 
subordinate to economic policies. In Japan, housing policies must take into 
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account other comprehensive policies such as five-year economic plans and 
national land policies (Hoshino 1973: 164-5; TMG 1988a; Ha 1987). In Korea, 
too, the housing policy and construction program of the MOC must be 
coordinated with comprehensive social and economic plans of the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB). Therefore, in Japan and Korea, the bureaucracy of the 
central state is organized to fully support economic development, while 
others are considered as secondary. Because no one centralized ministry has 
responsibility for housing, housing is not strongly represented in state 
expenditures. 
The Local State's Autonomy from the Central State 
Even though the central state does not place a priority on the housing 
sector in national policies, the local state can still make its own housing 
policies. Because of the lack of autonomy of the local state from the central 
state in Japan and Korea, however, local governments generally follow 
housing policies set by central governments. The legal system of appointing 
governors/mayors and the degree of fiscal independence of the local state 
from the central state demonstrate the limited autonomy of the local state 
from the central state. 
1. Appointment of Top Personnel 
Tokyo and Seoul have different legal processes for selecting top 
personnel: the governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government is elected 
by the citizens of Tokyo, whereas the mayor of the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government is appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs.ll In spite of the 
different selection procedure between the two cities, the local state has 
limited autonomy from the central state in both cities. In Seoul, the central 
state controls the appointment of the mayor. Therefore, the appointment 
system itself indicates the limited autonomy of the local state from the 
central state in Seoul. By contrast, in Tokyo, the governor has legal 
authority. However, he does not have much scope to exercise his rights in 
actual decision-making. 
The best example of the limitation of the governor's power is the case of 
Governor Minobe Ryokichi (1967-79), a progressive governor who was 
supported by the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party for the 
first time in history. Minobe achieved enormous popularity, largely as a 
result of his flair for pUblicity, his humanitarian image, and his anti-central 
llThe local political system has changed very recently in Korea. In 1995, the mayor of Seoul 
was elected by citizens for the first time in Korean history. 
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government and anti-business stands on environmental quality-of-life 
issues (Rix 1975; Jain 1987). He often emphasized the need to construct a 
large number of public housing units in Tokyo. However, this remained 
essentially political rhetoric, and was not translated into action. The main 
reason was his inability to raise revenue at the local level, through either 
taxation or borrowing, because of tight central control (Jain 1987; 1989). 
To understand this weak authority of the governor, it is necessary to 
review historical changes of the local government system in Japan. Japan's 
local government system under the Meiji Constitution (1889-1946) was 
heavily centralized. After World War II, the United States attempted to 
decentralize Japanese government during the Occupation based on the idea 
that local autonomy would serve as a check on tyranny, and thus prevent a 
recurrence of Japanese militarism (Reed 1986: 44). Some major changes 
under the U.S. occupation included direct elections of prefectural governors, 
the abolition of the Home Ministry, and the allocation of new authority to 
local government concerning police and compulsory education. But, 
Japanese local governments still operated under the previous tradition of 
centralization (Reed 1986: 25): 
In Japan the central ministries have broad authority to interpret the law 
in the absence of court decision, and they guard their authority jealously. 
Each time a local government has attempted to enact an innovative 
policy, the concerned ministry has argued that the ordinance conflicts 
with the law and is therefore illegal. 
There is no doubt that Japanese local governments have more 
independent power from the central government than their counterparts in 
Korea. Because the practice of powers by the Japanese local government is 
very limited, in reality, the gap between Tokyo and Seoul in terms of the 
relative autonomy of local state from the central state is not so great as 
presented in law. 
2. Fiscal Independence 
To perform independent policies, the local state needs to have an 
independent source of local income. In principle, local taxes are supposed to 
be levied, collected, and spent by local government. In practice, however, 
they are subject to central laws and guidance in Japan and Korea: the local 
government does not have much latitude in raising taxes, because the 
Ministry of Home Affairs in both countries sets standard rates and 
minimum rates of each local tax (Jain 1989: 150-5; Ha 1984). Therefore local 
governments in Japan and Korea are unable to perform massive housing 
projects independently, because they cannot increase their tax base or 
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change the items and percentages of local taxes. 
In sum, in Tokyo, in spite of the legal authority of a governor, the Tokyo 
metropolitan government is strongly controlled by the central state in 
making policies and raising financial resources. In Seoul, the power of 
mayor is even more restricted than in Tokyo because of the appointment 
system and the lack of authority to utilize finances independently. 
Therefore, the scope for the local state to perform its own housing policies is 
very limited in both cities. 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Comparative Analysis Between East Asia and the West 
Comparative analysis between East Asia and the West shows that state 
activities in Japan and Korea are very different from those in the West. First, 
the state's role in consumption, such as housing, is more developed in the 
West than Japan and Korea. The state in the former spends a greater 
percentage of state expenditures on consumption and housing than its 
counterparts in the latter (Tables 5-7). Considering housing policies and 
their changes in the West and East Asia, there seem to be at least two factors 
which affect the state's emphasis on social housing. The first factor is the 
development of a private housing market. In Europe, when private capital 
and housing markets were in no position to supply sufficient 
accommodation and make up for acute housing shortages after World War 
II, the provision of social housing reached its peak (Harloe 1988). By 
contrast, in the United States, where the economy and the private housing 
market recovered very rapidly after the war, the economic need for social 
housing was very limited. In Europe, too, as the private housing market has 
developed strikingly over the post-war period, the priority on social 
construction has declined. 
The underdevelopment of the private housing market may provide some 
grounds to induce the state's intervention in housing. However, it does not 
seem to be the sufficient cause of the expansion of social housing. The 
destruction of the private housing market and severe housing shortages 
after the war (World War II in Japan and the Korean War in Korea) were also 
found in Japan and Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to look at another 
factor, the influence of social democratic parties and the labor movements, 
to explain the Japanese and Korean governments' restriction on social 
housing, in spite of the similar background to Europe after the war. 
The stress on social housing policies was strongly influenced by social 
democratic parties in Europe, especially in the Netherlands and Denmark 
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(Harloe 1988: 50). In Britain, in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Labour 
governments were elected, there had been an increase in social housing, too. 
For social democratic parties, housing has been seen as a key means to 
achieve redistribution through policies associated with the welfare state in 
the post-war years. By contrast, in Japan and Korea, the power of laborers 
has been limited. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the 
authoritarian military regime in Korea have continuously retained political 
Dowers. Laborers are either cooperative or controlled by the state in these 
two countries. In these political and social contexts, the ideology of social 
housing has not emerged. 
Second, the local state is directly linked with housing provisions in most 
Western countries, whereas it lacks authority to perform its own policies in 
Japan and Korea. In the West, the local state is involved in housing provision 
(Harloe 1988; Wynn 1984): local authorities in Britain are themselves the 
landlords; public housing authorities in the United States are created by 
local government; and corporations of social housing are subject to local 
government controls in the Netherlands and Denmark. To protect its own 
interest, the local state sometimes creates conflict and resistance with the 
central state in some Western countries. By contrast, in Japan and Korea, the 
authority of local governments is very much limited by the central government. 
Third, East Asia and the West also differ in terms of emphasizing the 
supply-side subsidy and the demand-side subsidy. The Western housing 
subsidy system has shifted away from supply-side subsidy to demand-side 
subsidy from the 1960s onwards (Harloe 1985: 201). By contrast, the 
Japanese and Korean counterpart heavily depends on supply-side subsidy. 
Examples of demand-side subsidies in the West are Aide Personnalisee au 
Logement (APL) in France, housing allowances for low income families in 
Denmark and West Germany, rent allowance in Britain, and the section 8 
program12 in the United States. Most of them have experienced rapid 
growth especially in the 1970s, whereas construction subsidies to stimulate 
the production of private rental housing in these countries have declined 
due to the increase of homeownership. In contrast to the West, Japan and 
Korea do not have any development of the demand-side subsidy. 
The supply-side subsidy supports new construction and low rents, thus 
tied to housing units. Once families in public housing move out, they 
cannot enjoy governmental subsidies. By contrast, the demand-side subsidy 
pays a part of the rent to the family, thus connecting directly with housing 
12Unlike other housing allowance programs, the section 8 program combines elements of 
demand and supply assistance. 
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consumers (Weicher 1980; Harloe 1985). According to Mayo and 
Barnbrock's (1985: 132-54) comparative analysis between demand and 
supply oriented rental housing programs in the United States and West 
Germany,13 despite the overall similarity of program benefits, the former is 
superior to the latter in terms of program costs (Mayo and Barnbrock 1985: 
152): 
In the midseventies, the annual cost of providing a new unit through a 
u.s. producer-oriented program was estimated roughly 50 to 100 percent 
greater than that of providing a unit through a consumer-oriented 
program. In West Germany, new units provided by Social Housing 
(supply-oriented) were estimated to cost roughly three times as much on 
an annual basis as units supported by Wohngeld (demand-oriented). (Italic 
letters are added by an author). 
Therefore, the Western subsidy system is more efficient than its counterpart 
in Japan and Korea at least in terms of cost saving. 
Comparative Analysis between Tokyo and Seoul 
Despite striking similarities between Tokyo and Seoul in terms of state 
activity in the housing sector compared to their Western counterparts, these 
two cities differ in stressing quality and equality in housing policies. First, 
Japanese housing policies are more quality-oriented than their counterparts 
in Korea. This difference can be compared by analyzing each country's five-
year housing construction plans. According to Table I, the focus of Japanese 
housing policies has gradually changed from the quantity of housing to the 
quality of hOUSing. In a series of Japanese housing plans in the 1950s and 
the 1960s, emphasis was given to the quantity of housing to achieve the goal 
of "one house per household". In the early 1970s, the Japanese government 
stressed the density of housing for the first time. Since the third five-year 
housing construction plan (1976-80), however, the emphasis on the quantity 
of housing has completely disappeared from Japanese housing policy. By 
contrast, the Korean government has always struggled with insufficient 
quantity of housing (Table 2). Throughout six housing construction plans 
spanning 1962 to 1991, the increase in housing supply has always been the 
first concern in housing policies. This difference between the two countries 
reflects the greater housing shortage in Korea. 
13Eight different housing programs are compared: three U.S. supply (producer)-oriented 
programs - Public Housing, Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction; three U.s. demand 
(consumer)-oriented programs - Section 23, Housing Allowances, and Section 8 Existing 
Housing; one West German supply-oriented program - Social Housing; and one West 
German demand-oriented program - Wohngeld housing allowances. 
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The second difference between Japan and Korea is the degree of emphasis 
on equality in housing policies. In Japan, even though the function of public 
housing for low-income households is not strong, at least it does exist, while 
permanent public rental housing for the poor is not developed at all in 
Korea. Therefore, it is fair to say that the Japanese government is more 
concerned with equality in the housing sector than the Korean government. 
The two countries' difference in terms of the emphasis on equality in the 
housing sector is also related to the fact that the Japanese government was 
concerned with social welfare much earlier than the Korean government. In 
Japan, the concept of "improvement of social welfare" first appeared in 1973 
as a part of the Basic Economic Social Plan (Kosai and Ogino 1984; Kosai 
1987), while it was in the Sixth Five-Year Social and Economic Plans 0987-
1991) that the Korean government included social welfare for the first time 
in national policies (the KNHC 1989). 
At least two reasons explain the differences between Japan and Korea: the 
two countries' different levels of economic development, and different 
levels of the local state's legal authority. The first cause is obvious. With 
more resources than Korea, Japan could solve its housing shortage problem 
in the early 1970s. Therefore, it could move into the next step of housing 
policy emphasizing quality, while Korea still had severe problems of 
housing quantity. The second cause is that in Japan, in spite of the strong 
central state's intervention in actual policy making, the local state is at least 
a legal entity. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has its own publicly 
managed housing program for low-income households, while the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government does not have any housing policy to improve 
equality. This different state system in Japan and Korea is partly related to 
different U.S. interests and policies after World War II. Before 1945, both 
countries had strongly centralized state structures. During the Occupation 
in Japan, the United States was interested in endowing strong power to 
local states in order to prevent future militarism in Japan (Reed 1986). 
However, the Korean situation was different from the Japanese one. Because 
of competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was more interested 
in establishing a strong right-wing government in Korea (Jun 1991) than in 
developing local power. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike production, the state in Japan and Korea has not played an active 
and effective role in consumption including housing. The Japanese and 
Korean states have allocated lower percentages of budget to consumption 
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than their counterparts in the West. Housing policies in Japan and Korea 
have emphasized the increase of homeownership largely for middle-income 
households, ignoring housing construction for low-income households. 
However, the percentage of homeownership has not actually increased over 
the past two decades. Tax and land policies have not effectively solved the 
most severe housing problem in Japan and Korea, the rapid increase of land 
and housing prices. 
Three characteristics of the internal structure of the state explain why the 
Japanese and Korean states have played an ineffective role in the housing 
sector. First, economic development has always been a primary national 
goal in Japan and Korea. Thanks to weakly organized labor, the state in 
Japan and Korea has not confronted the pressure to allocate its resources to 
consumption in order to get the support from laborers. Second, in terms of 
the administrative structure, there is no single ministry which is fully 
responsible for housing policies. Even though the Ministry of Construction 
is in charge of housing policies, it is required to cooperate with other 
Ministries and to consider other policies, especially the national economic 
policies. Thus, the Ministry of Construction lacks the authority to make its 
own housing policies. Third, whereas the local state in the West has relative 
autonomy from the central state in formulating and implementing housing 
policies, the local state in Japan and Korea lacks such autonomy. Therefore, 
the Japanese and Korean local states have passively followed the national 
housing policies. 
Even though the Japanese and Korean states are similar at the macro level 
when they are compared to other Western states, they are different at the 
micro level. The Japanese state is more quality and equality oriented than 
the Korean state. These differences are resultant from the three different 
factors between the two countries. First, because of its strong economic 
power, the Japanese state has been able to spend more financial resources in 
consumption, which has definitely contributed to solving housing shortage 
problems in Tokyo after the Second World War. Second, in terms of the 
internal structure of the state, the Japanese local state has more authority 
than the Korean local state. In 1991, Korea also took steps toward 
localization similar to Japan, such as the establishment of local assemblies. 
Therefore, the gap between Japan and Korea in terms of the local state's 
power is likely to decline in the long run. Third, the Korean state which is 
based on the military, is more authoritarian than the Japanese state. Unlike 
the Japanese state, the Korean state has been able to control the demands for 
consumption by force. 
To conclude, the Japanese and Korean states show the unique 
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characteristics of the state. They are capitalist states, but their relatively 
strong intervention in production differentiates them from market-oriented 
states such as the United States. Their ineffective role in consumption also 
puts them in a different position from most welfare states in Europe. 
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